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Lessons for International Tax Reform from the US State Experience under 
Formulary Apportionment 
 
Kimberly Clausing 
 
 
Summary 
 
This work undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the US state experience under formulary 
apportionment of corporate income. While formulary apportionment eliminates the possibility of 
shifting income across states through accounting strategies that manipulate where income is 
booked, it may heighten the tax responsiveness of formula factors. The present analysis uses 
the substantial variation in corporate tax policy decisions of US states over the period 1986 to 
2012 to understand the consequences of formulary apportionment better. It examines the effects 
of policy choices regarding tax rates, formula weights, and other parameters on economic 
activity, estimating the tax sensitivity of employment, investment, and sales. With the inclusion of 
adequate control variables, results indicate that economic activity has not been particularly 
sensitive to US state corporate tax policy choices, especially in recent years. Still, tax policy 
choices have important effects on corporate tax revenues. These results suggest important 
lessons regarding possible international adoption of formulary apportionment. 
 
Keywords: tax competition; formulary apportionment; unitary taxation; corporate taxation; 
international taxation; state taxation; corporate tax revenue. 
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Introduction  
 
There is an understandable desire to improve systems for taxing international corporate income. 
Presently, tax systems rely on separate accounting, whereby multinational corporations account 
separately for income and expenses earned in each taxing jurisdiction. Numerous observers 
have vocally criticised this system: it is difficult to establish the true source of income, and 
multinational firms have become increasingly adept at shifting income from highly-taxed 
jurisdictions to more lightly-taxed ones.1 Governments have often attempted to curb such 
income-shifting behaviour through regulations, yet these regulations are complicated, costly to 
administer, and often ineffective. Multinational corporations are also not content: they complain 
of high compliance costs, substantial uncertainty regarding ultimate tax burdens, and unfair tax-
based competitive pressures in the global marketplace. 
 
In this environment, formulary apportionment has emerged as a compelling alternative for 
international tax reform. Under formulary apportionment, income is assigned to each taxing 
jurisdiction based on a simple formula. This system has the potential for large benefits in terms 
of simplicity, administration, and curbing tax base erosion. However, formulary apportionment 
may create its own practical difficulties. For example, there are accounting concerns about the 
measurement of the formula components and the tax base, as well as legal concerns about the 
definition of a consolidated business and the impact on international tax treaties. 
 
Beyond the pragmatic details of implementation, there are also important concerns that a 
formulary approach will generate its own tax distortions. For example, multinational corporations 
may respond to formulary apportionment by moving the activities that are used to determine the 
assignment of income to low-tax jurisdictions. Also, there are important questions about the 
revenue consequences of formulary apportionment.  
 
This paper uses the US state experience with formulary apportionment to inform both of these 
concerns. In particular, it considers the tax sensitivity of formula factors under formula 
apportionment, and it evaluates the determinants of corporate tax revenue under a formulary 
system. The empirical analysis focuses on US state corporate tax policy choices over the period 
1986 to 2012. 
 
In the context of international tax policy choices, an analysis of the US state experience may 
seem peculiar. Yet the US state experience may provide insight into the dynamics of 
international tax competition. US states are more economically integrated than countries are 
presently, but the extent of economic integration among US states demonstrates one possible 
future for global economic integration.  
 
Further, US states provide a useful source of policy variation for understanding the 
consequences of formulary apportionment, since they retain a great deal of autonomy on 
corporate tax policy choices.2 US states choose tax rates, formulas, and other rules 
independently, and states have not shied away from policy changes. These types of policy 
                                                 
1  Empirical evidence on income shifting is well known; see the survey articles of De Mooij (2005) and De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2008). Clausing (2009, 2011) indicates that income-shifting behaviour has high revenue costs for high-tax rate 
governments. This issue has received policy attention of late, with hearings in the US Congress and UK Parliament, as well 
as attention in recent G8 and G20 meetings.  
2  Still, a common (and economically significant) federal layer of taxation exists for US states.  
 
 7
variation are used to understand better the consequences of formulary apportionment for both 
economic activity and revenue.  
 
In terms of economic activity results demonstrate very little tax sensitivity, in contrast to some 
early studies of this question. The divergent findings may result in part from the longer time 
period under investigation in the present study. For example, as more and more states have 
engaged in tax competition by increasing sales factor weights and making other rules more 
favourable, the effect of individual state policy choices may have been muted. There is evidence 
in the early literature that states that increased sales weights gained employment at other states’ 
expense. However, in the recent period, as more and more states have increased sales weights, 
there is no evidence of these effects persisting. 
 
In terms of tax revenues, this analysis suggests that tax policy decisions are important. States 
that increase sales weights or allow elective features of their tax policy environment have lower 
tax revenues, while higher tax rates and ‘throwback rules’ are associated with higher corporate 
tax revenues.  
 
Together with the results on activity, this result suggests important policy lessons for potential 
international adoption of formulary apportionment. In particular, under formulary apportionment 
countries will likely remain tempted by beggar-my-neighbour tax policy competition. Efforts to 
assure harmonised formulas and to protect the corporate tax base from erosion will still be 
important.  
 
 
1 What can we learn from US states? 
 
US states have a long experience with formulary apportionment of corporate income. After the 
US corporate income tax was adopted in the early twentieth century, US states realised the 
difficulty of separate accounting for income and expenses in each state in an environment when 
business activity is well-integrated across states. Thus, by the mid-twentieth century US states 
allocated national income to state jurisdictions by formula.3  
 
At first, the common formula employed by US states was based on three factors, the share of a 
firm’s payroll, assets, and sales in a particular state:  
 
Taxi = ti US 13
Ai
AUS
 Si
SUS
 Pi
PUS








     (1) 
 
where the subscript i indicates a particular state and the subscript US indicates the United 
States, ti is the state tax rate, us is US profit, A is assets, S is Sales, and P is payroll. Observers 
have noted that a formulary system creates an implicit tax on the factors used in the formula, 
thus discouraging assets and employment in high-tax locations.  
 
In part due to these concerns, as well as business lobbying, many states have increased the 
weight on their sales factor in recent decades, often doubling it relative to weights on other 
factors. Some states have even adopted sales-only formulas, where tax liabilities are calculated 
as: 
                                                 
3  A detailed history is provided in Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1998). 
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Taxi = ti US SiSUS



         (2) 
 
Indeed, over the period of the study (1986-2012), there have been many changes in state 
formulas for allocating corporate income. In 1986, 80 per cent of states that taxed corporate 
income used an equal-weighted formula, and 20 per cent had higher weights on sales. By 2012, 
in contrast, only 17 per cent of states that taxed corporate income used an equal-weighted 
formula; the rest had formulas with a larger weight on sales. In recent years, there has been a 
spurt of states adopting single-sales formulas, where the entire weight is on the sales factor. 
Figure 1 shows this experience. 
 
Figure 1 Share of states using different formulas 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of states with a ⅓ weight on sales (equal-weighted formula with sales, assets, and payroll), with 
heavier weights on sales (between equal and single), and with single-factor sales formulas. Data on formulas was compiled from 
various sources, described in detail in Appendix 1. 
   
There is also substantial variation between states in other corporate tax policy rules: whether 
combined reporting is required, whether there are throwback rules that tax ‘nowhere’ income, 
whether options are offered between formula types or reporting requirements, and so on. 
Further, states have frequently experimented with changes in corporate tax rates as well, 
although corporate tax rates for the average of all states are relatively stable over time, 
averaging 7.2 per cent in 1986, and 6.6 per cent in 2012. 
 
While US states provide a valuable and diverse set of corporate tax policy experiences under 
formulary apportionment to study, there are also important caveats to bear in mind. US states 
typically choose low tax rates, and the response of economic activity to tax rate differences is 
likely to be larger and more apparent at higher tax rates.  
 
Also, US states exist within a common federal system, and there is no analogous supranational 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Equal Weighted Single Sales Between Equal and Single
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body in most cases.4 A common federal system makes it easier to determine the tax base to 
which the formula should apply, since most US states begin with the federal definition of income 
as their baseline tax base. Still, the common federal system itself heightens tax competition 
pressures, since it facilitates economic mobility of all types. Footloose firms have an easier time 
relocating across states than across national boundaries, and domestic product competition is 
fiercer than its international counterpart – prices are more uniform and comparable, there is no 
possibility of exchange rate fluctuations, information is more available, and goods mobility is 
more seamless. For these reasons, one would expect tax competition to be fiercer within 
countries than between countries, so this may also reduce the applicability of the US state 
experience. 
 
 
2  Prior work 
 
This paper will build on the insights of past work on formulary apportionment, both internationally 
and at the state level. Prior work on the international implications of formulary systems includes 
Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2008), Avi-Yonah et al. (2009), De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008), 
Devereux and Loretz (2008a, 2008b), Eichner and Runkel (2008), Fuest et al. (2007), Hines 
(2010), and Pethig and Wagener (2007). 
 
Regarding the US state experience, state incentives to change formulas are well known: Anand 
and Sansing (2000), Edmiston (2002), and Pinto (2007) generate models of formula choice, and 
Omer and Shelley (2004) empirically document the trend towards higher sales factor weights. 
Recently, Chirinko and Wilson (2010) consider the role of political contributions and state tax 
policy competition over the period 1988-2006. They find that policymakers are sensitive to 
campaign contributions, and their results document the nature of tax competition among states. 
Results also indicate the importance of including state-specific fixed effects in specifications; 
without this inclusion, some of the results are perverse.  
 
Mintz and Smart (2004) have a clear and compelling study of the effects of formulary 
apportionment on income-shifting incentives, making use of the Canadian example. Some, but 
not all, multijurisdictional firms are required to allocate income to Canadian provinces by formula. 
Using data from the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency over the period 1986-99, they find 
that taxable income is far less sensitive to tax rates, indicating less income shifting, for firms that 
are required to allocate income by formula. 
 
The effects of formula choice on economic activity have also received some attention, and three 
studies employ cross-state-level data to consider the relationship between formula choice and 
employment, sales, and investment. First, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) consider employment 
effects over the period 1978-94: they find evidence that employment is sensitive to the weight on 
employment in the formula, and there is evidence of tax competition among states whereby 
states gain employment at the expense of other states.  
 
Second, Gupta and Hofmann (2003) consider the impact of formula choices, tax rates, and other 
policy choices such as investment incentives on capital expenditure effects over the period 
1983-96. In the specifications that employ fixed effects, the effects of tax policy measures are 
                                                 
4  One possible exception would be the European Union, although the role of the EU government is substantially smaller than 
the US federal government, and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
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smaller than in other specifications, but still statistically significant.5 They note that the revenue 
losses associated with lower tax burdens are likely more consequential than the effects on 
investment magnitudes. 
  
Third, Klassen and Shackelford (1998) consider the effect of sales weights in the apportionment 
formula on manufacturing revenue, their measure of sales, over the period 1983-91. They find 
that in throwback states, but not in others, manufacturing revenues are sensitive to the tax rate 
applied to sales. Their analysis is confined to separate estimates of cross-sections of states for 
each year in their sample; they do not employ panel data techniques. All three of these studies 
focus on a period that excludes the recent time period of rapid policy changes, so they 
necessarily utilise less variation than the present analysis.6 
 
There has been some promising work on state corporate tax revenues, including Gupta et al. 
(2009), Cornia et al. (2005), Fox and Luna (2005), and Mazerov (2001). Gupta et al. (2009) is 
the most fully developed analysis. The authors undertake a study of the determinants of state 
corporate tax revenues over the period 1982-2002; their data set allows controls for most 
important considerations. They find that states that increase sales factor weights have lower 
corporate revenues, but revenues increase with the tax rate. Throwback rules and broader 
definitions of business income increase revenues, but combined reporting has no effect. The 
authors note that the policy environment has continued to evolve rapidly in the years since their 
study, so including an additional decade of data in the present study is likely useful. 
 
Both the economic activity and revenue studies discussed above focus on earlier periods, and 
the present study will allow a consideration of both recent changes and longer-run effects from 
early changes. Further, the present work will benefit from taking a comprehensive approach that 
considers the effects of both formula choices and other tax policy choices on a wide range of 
economic outcomes.  
 
There will also be essential methodological improvements over prior work. For example, not all 
prior studies employ state-specific fixed effects, yet this is important in order to prevent spurious 
statistical correlations that could easily result from omitted variables. For example, if states that 
are particularly business-friendly are also more likely to weight the sales factor heavily in their 
formulas, and one does not include state fixed effects, then one would risk attributing increases 
to economic activity solely to the increase in the sales factor, when other aspects of states’ 
policies may be far more important. 
 
 
3  Specifications 
 
The present analysis will undertake an investigation of how policy decisions by US states under 
formulary apportionment affect US state government corporate income tax revenues as well as 
economic activities across US states. Dependent variables are defined and summarised in Table 
1. They fall into four categories: measures of employment, investment, sales, and government 
revenues. 
                                                 
5  Results imply that states with a property burden (the multiple of their tax rate and the formula weight on property) one  
percentage point higher are associated with 0.09 per cent lower new capital expenditure. There is some evidence that there 
is greater tax rate sensitivity in states that employ throwback rules or unitary taxation, but in general these effects are quite 
modest. 
6  In this analysis, I check results from baseline specifications for early years in the sample, finding that some results are 
sensitive to the time period studied; economic activity appears more tax sensitive in early years. Possible reasons for this 
finding are discussed below. 
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Table 1 Variable descriptions, definitions, and summary statistics 
 
Name Definition Source No.  Mean St.Dev. 
 
 
Dependent variables: 
  
Employment 
(lnem) 
Thousands of jobs, incl. full and part time 
employees, sole proprietors, partners 
 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
1326 3,063 3,322 
Capital 
expenditure 
(lnkexp) 
Total capital expenditure for plant and equipment, 
in mil. $ 
 
Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers 
1273 2,495 2,985 
Sales 
(lnsales) 
Value of shipments of all products, in mil. $  Annual Survey 
Manufacturers 
 
1275 76,800 87,300 
Corporate tax 
revenue 
Taxes on income of corporations and 
businesses, as share of GSP (in %)  
US Census Bureau 1325 0.340 0.250 
 
Explanatory variables: tax policy parameters 
 
Payroll burden 
(payburden) 
Multiple of corporate tax rate and payroll weight 
in formula 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1244 .0189 .0096 
Asset burden 
(assetbur) 
Multiple of corporate tax rate and asset weight in 
formula 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1244 .0189 .0096 
Salesburden Multiple of corporate tax rate and sales weight in 
formula 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1244 .0383 .0199 
Throwback  Dummy variable for state throwback rule 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1245 .560 .497 
Combrep Dummy variable for state requiring combined 
reporting 
Various  
(appendix) 
1237 .379 .485 
Pitax Personal income tax, top rate 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1352 .059 .031 
Licgsp Corporate licence and other fees as a share of 
GSP 
 
US Census Bureau 1325 .064 .165 
Throwsb Multiple of throwback dummy and sales burden Constructed 1231 .0192 .0207 
Forchoice Dummy if corporations have a choice of formula 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1249 .085 .279 
Crchoice Dummy if firms have choice of combined 
reporting 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1237 .150 .358 
Rate Corporate tax rate, top rate 
 
Various  
(appendix) 
1368 .070 .029 
Salesw Weight on sales in formula Various  
(appendix) 
1249 .505 .205 
 
Explanatory variables: economic conditions parameters 
 
Natlunem National (US) unemployment rate Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
1377 .061 .015 
Unem State unemployment rate Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
 
1377 .057 .019 
GSP Gross State Product, mil. $ Bureau of Ec. Analysis  1326 182,875 241,182 
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(lngsp) 
 
GSPPC  
(lngsppc) 
Gross State Product per capita, $/person 
 
Population data, Census 
 
1326 33,430 16,150 
Osurplus 
(lnosurplus) 
Business income of private enterprises, mil. $ Bureau of Ec. Analysis 1326 65,850 90,100 
 
Explanatory variables: structure of state economy 
 
BA Share of state population with a Bachelor’s 
Degree (as %) 
US Census Bureau 1377 24.1 5.89 
Manufratio Ratio of total employment in the manufacturing 
sector 
 
Bureau of Ec. Analysis 1324 .1005 .0458 
Youngshare Share of population 18 and under US Census 1300 .255 .023 
Oldshare Share of population 65 and over 
 
US Census 
 
1300 .126 .020 
Region Dummies Dummies for states from various regions 
 
From Crone (2005) 1515 Varies Varies 
Share Share of business tax returns that are flow-
through entities  
US Internal Revenue 
Service 
1150 .680 .096 
 
Other variables used for policy probits 
 
Meansalesw Mean sales weight in state formulas, by year 
 
Constructed 1377 .503 .089 
Meanrate Mean corporate tax rate of states, by year 
 
Constructed 1377 .070 .002 
Rep Dummy if Republicans control state legislative 
and executive branches 
Klarner Politics Dataset 
(appendix) 
1271 .196 .397 
Dem Dummy if Democrats control state legislative and 
executive branches 
Klarner Politics Dataset 
(appendix) 
1271 .243 .429 
Elecyr Dummy variable if election year in state  US Statistical Abstract 
 
1316 .273 .446 
Debtgsp State debt as a share of GSP 
 
State Government 
Finances 
1286 .071 .040 
Aidgsp State federal aid as a share of GSP US Census  1214 .034 .013 
 
 
The basic specifications relate the dependent variables to the explanatory variables as in the 
following equations, where P is a vector of tax policy choices, E and S are vectors of control 
variables capturing the macroeconomic conditions of states and the structure of the state 
economy, and where i indicates states and t indicates years. 
 
Employment measureit  ii  pPit
P
  eEit
E
  sSit
S
 it   (3) 
Investment measureit  ii  pPit
P
  eEit
E
  sSit
S
 it   (4) 
Sales measureit  ii  pPit
P
  eEit
E
  sSit
S
 it    (5) 
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Revenue measureit  ii  pPit
P
  eEit
E
  sSit
S
 it    (6) 
 
For this investigation, state-level policy choices are of most interest. It is hypothesised that the 
policy choices will typically affect revenues and economic activity in opposite directions; policies 
that increase tax burdens typically raise revenue but also discourage economic activity. For 
example, higher tax rates increase revenue as long as Laffer curve effects do not predominate, 
which is unlikely at the low levels of taxation of US states.7 But higher tax rates also raise the tax 
burden on any factors that are in the formula, presumably discouraging such activities in US 
states. 
 
For example, following Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), the firm’s marginal tax rate is the sum of 
the state tax rates over the states in which it operates. If all firms are taxed according to an 
equal-weighted formula, as in Equation 1, and states are indexed by i, this becomes: 
 
  1
3
ti
i
 AiAus  tii
Si
Sus
 ti
i
 PiPus



      (7) 
 
If the firm moves workers from high-tax to low-tax states, it will reduce its marginal tax rate. 
Assuming that the total payroll is unchanged, moving payroll towards a particular low tax state (j) 
changes the firm’s marginal tax rate as follows: 
 

Pj
 1
3Pus



 t j  tii j
Pi
Pi
i j







     (8)
 
 
As long as the tax rate in the state with increased jobs is lower than the weighted average of 
other states’ tax rates, the firm’s marginal tax rate on US income declines.  
 
US states have often increased the sales factor weights in recent decades. Indeed, the weight 
on the sales factor directly lessens the burden on other factors, and so one would expect tax-
sensitive firms to be more likely to locate productive factors (assets and employment) in high 
sales factor states. However, a higher sales weight will reduce corporate revenues for states 
where their asset and employment activity shares are higher than their sales shares. Indeed, 
dominant productive firms in local economies often lobby for increases in the sales factor in the 
formula.  
 
In theory, if states consume roughly in line with their production, and if all states moved to a 
sales-only formula, both the overall tax burden for firms and state revenues would be 
unchanged. But since firms often lack nexus in a particular state, not all sales generate 
associated corporate tax revenues under the present system. Further, since states vary in their 
formula choices, firms may be able to lower their overall tax burden by taking advantage of these 
differences and altering the location of their activities accordingly. 
 
                                                 
7  Revenues will fall with increases in the tax rate if the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate is sufficiently large. 
Clausing (2007, 2008) finds that the revenue-maximising corporate tax rate is likely to be higher than the rates found in 
typical OECD countries. 
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Discretionary features of the corporate tax policy environment may also lighten tax burdens on 
corporations as well as lower revenues. When firms are allowed to choose between different 
formulas, or to choose whether to utilise combined reporting, they are likely to make informed 
choices that lessen their tax burden.  
 
Some states attempt to counter these revenue-reducing tax competition pressures. For example, 
some states employ throwback rules. States that use throwback rules require firms to pay tax on 
income that is untaxed in another state. Also, some US states require combined reporting; this 
can help ensure that large multijurisdictional firms do not avoid taxation by splitting themselves 
into separate corporations and manipulating transactions within the overall corporate group. In 
the present analysis, dummy variables are used to capture such features of the state corporate 
tax code.  
 
Control variables will allow for the effects of the health of the state economy, structural features 
of the state economy, and time-specific and state-specific effects. All variables are described 
and summarised in Table 1; the data sources are described in detail in Appendix 1.  
 
 
4  Results 
 
4.1 Employment activity 
 
Results from the employment specifications are in Table 2. Specifications (1) to (3) employ state 
fixed effects; column (1) is the most basic model, and columns (2) and (3) add more explanatory 
variables. Columns (4) to (6) repeat these specifications, adding year fixed effects in addition to 
state fixed effects. 
  
 15
Table 2 Employment regressions, state fixed effects (1-3), state and year fixed  
effects (4-6) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln of employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
payburden -10.94* 1.191* -0.153 0.765* 1.221* -0.201 
 
(0.566) (0.313) (0.118) (0.338) (0.315) (0.111) 
natlunem -0.956* -0.812* -1.082*    
 
(0.217) (0.0978) (0.0411) 
   
throwback  -0.0273* -0.00464  -0.0275* -0.00856* 
  
(0.00765) (0.00287) 
 
(0.00772) (0.00272) 
combrep  -0.0139* -0.000428  -0.0156* -0.00218 
  
(0.00406) (0.00157) 
 
(0.00414) (0.00149) 
lngsppc  0.369* -0.690*  0.365* -0.681* 
  
(0.00573) (0.0155) 
 
(0.0353) (0.0176) 
pitax   0.180*   0.158* 
   
(0.0629) 
  
(0.0605) 
licgsp   -6.808*   -9.248* 
   
(1.881) 
  
(1.771) 
lngsp   0.859*   0.866* 
   
(0.0111) 
  
(0.0105) 
ba   0.000402   0.00101* 
   
(0.00045) 
  
(0.00048) 
manufratio   0.928*   0.711* 
   
(0.0481) 
  
(0.0556) 
youngshare   -1.419*   -1.777* 
   
(0.0801) 
  
(0.0840) 
oldshare   -0.248   -0.767* 
   
(0.127) 
  
(0.143) 
 
Fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects? no no no yes yes yes 
N 1122 1102 1032 1122 1102 1032 
R2 0.258 0.853 0.981 0.832 0.857 0.984 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
In all cases apart from the first specification, the payroll burden variable, which is the simple 
multiple of the payroll weight and the tax rate, is either statistically insignificant or unexpectedly 
positive. In the first (and most bare-bones) specification, however, it is both negative and 
statistically significant.  
 
Throwback rules and combined reporting requirements are negatively associated with 
employment in some specifications, though their empirical magnitudes are zero or very small in 
the full specifications. The variable that indicates corporate licence fees relative to GDP is also 
negatively associated with employment, though given the extremely low mean of this variable, its 
empirical magnitude is also very small.8  
 
                                                 
8  Increasing licence fees by 25% of the mean value for this variable is associated with one-tenth of 1% lower employment. 
Personal income tax rates are positively associated with employment. 
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Most control variable results are as expected. Economic conditions are associated with 
employment in the hypothesised direction. When national unemployment rates are high, that is 
associated with lower employment in states; this variable is dropped from the time-effects 
specifications due to lack of state-level variation. State-level gross domestic product is positively 
associated with employment.  
 
Several variables are used to capture structural features of the economy. In equations (2) and 
(5), higher gross state product (GSP) per capita states also have higher employment. In 
equations (3) and (6), the estimated coefficient on this variable changes sign, but several other 
control variables are introduced, including the share of the population with a college degree 
(positively associated with employment in equation 6), the ratio of workers that are in 
manufacturing (positively associated with employment levels), and the share of young (18 and 
under) and old (65 and over) in the population, both of which are negatively associated with 
employment. 
 
Appendix 2 shows the same specifications without fixed effects. These results are not included 
in the text throughout the paper, since statistical tests overwhelming indicate that fixed state 
effects are required. Further, the exclusion of state fixed effects risks biasing the coefficients due 
to spurious correlations between tax policy variables and other features of a state. The inclusion 
of fixed effects has an important effect on the results, as Appendix 2 indicates.9   
 
4.2 Investment activity 
 
Table 3 considers how tax policy variables affect investment across US states, using data on 
capital expenditure from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. Again, fixed state effects are 
necessary, and columns (1) to (3) show fixed state effects, while columns (4) to (6) include both 
state and year fixed effects. 
  
                                                 
9  For comparison, Table A1 shows regular pooled regressions (specifications 1-3) and regressions with region fixed effects 
(specifications 4-6), following the region designations of Crone (2005). These specifications show a large and negative 
statistically significant effect of the payroll tax burden, although the effect gets smaller when the full set of controls are 
included. In specification (6), a standard deviation increase in the payroll tax burden (equal to 50% of the mean burden) 
would reduce employment by 0.6%. The control variables are broadly consistent with results in the main specifications, 
though throwback rules and combined reporting requirements are sometimes positively associated with employment. The 
mid-Atlantic states are the omitted region; other regions typically have higher employment in the full specification, reported in 
column 6. 
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Table 3 Capital expenditure regressions, state fixed effects (1-3), state and year fixed 
effects (4-6) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln of capital expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
assetbur -16.04* 5.575* 4.640* 4.966* 6.078* 4.567* 
 
(1.641) (1.707) (1.652) (1.521) (1.511) (1.517) 
unem -6.235* -5.821* -3.809* -6.358* -4.262* -2.713* 
 
(0.566) (0.479) (0.551) (0.736) (0.817) (0.887) 
throwback  0.0407 0.0844*  -0.0148 0.0351 
  
(0.0409) (0.0393) 
 
(0.0366) (0.0367) 
combrep  -0.00321 0.0189  -0.0315 0.00504 
  
(0.0210) (0.0208) 
 
(0.0190) (0.0195) 
lngsppc  0.682* 0.539*  1.290* 0.149 
  
(0.0319) (0.221) 
 
(0.178) (0.251) 
pitax   0.150   -1.839* 
   
(0.884) 
  
(0.836) 
licgsp   28.00   -19.76 
   
(25.71) 
  
(23.83) 
lngsp   0.704*   0.604* 
   
(0.155) 
  
(0.144) 
ba   -0.0194*   -0.0203* 
   
(0.00600) 
  
(0.00636) 
manufratio   7.365*   4.731* 
   
(0.724) 
  
(0.802) 
youngshare   3.544*   -1.480 
   
(1.101) 
  
(1.126) 
oldshare   7.959*   -3.978* 
   
(1.730) 
  
(1.940) 
 
Fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects? no no no yes yes yes 
N 1084 1064 998 1084 1064 998 
R2 0.149 0.417 0.503 0.540 0.561 0.601 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
The main tax policy variable of interest is the measure of tax burden on assets, the multiple of 
the corporate tax rate and the weight on assets in the formula allocation. In the first specification, 
without additional controls, there is a statistically significantly negative relation between this tax 
burden and capital expenditure; however, all other empirical models shown in columns (2) to (6) 
show unexpectedly positive relationships between asset tax burdens and capital expenditure, 
even after a full set of control variables is included. Other tax policy measures (the throwback 
rule, required combined reporting, the personal income tax, and corporate licence fees) are 
typically statistically insignificant, with the exception of one positive effect of throwback rules in 
column (3) and one negative effect of personal income taxes in column (6).  
 
Economic control variables have the expected associations with capital expenditure, with state-
wide unemployment associated with lower capital expenditure and increased GSP associated 
with increased capital expenditure. Structural control variables indicate a positive relationship 
between GSP per capita and investment, and between the manufacturing ratio in the economy 
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and investment. There is a negative relationship between the share of the population with a 
college degree and investment, and demographic variables have mixed effects. Again, Appendix 
Table A2 reports ordinary pooled regressions as well as pooled regressions with region-specific 
effects.10  
 
4.3 Sales activity 
 
Table 4 reports regressions on sales across US states, following similar specification choices as 
above. Columns 1-3 report state fixed effects, and columns 4-6 report specifications with both 
state and year fixed effects. An additional policy variable is considered here, the interaction 
between the sales burden and the throwback rule dummy variable. This is intended to capture 
the fact that sales burdens will be more burdensome if states are also taxing income that is 
earned in another state. According to the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 
(UDITPA), sales may be ‘thrown back’ to the state from which the sales are shipped if the seller 
is not taxable in the destination state or if the buyer is the US government. 
  
                                                 
10  As is the case throughout the paper, pooled results are not included in the text, since statistical tests overwhelming indicate 
that fixed state effects are required. In Table A2, the full model of columns (3) and (6) show no statistically significant 
relationship between asset tax burdens and capital expenditure, but the simpler empirical models of columns (1), (2), (4), 
and (5) do show the expected negative relationship between asset tax burdens and capital investment. 
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Table 4 Sales regressions, state fixed effects (1-3), state and year fixed effects (4-6) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln of sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
salesburden 9.556* 0.0364 -0.0885 -0.255 0.0125 -0.0847 
 
(0.726) (0.526) (0.487) (0.414) (0.483) (0.465) 
unem -2.222* -2.109* -0.888* -4.406* -1.561* 0.764 
 
(0.495) (0.252) (0.258) (0.445) (0.451) (0.435) 
throwback  -0.0220 -0.0145  -0.0626* -0.0342 
  
(0.0327) (0.0285) 
 
(0.0308) (0.0277) 
throwsb  -0.493 -0.209  -0.300 -0.402 
  
(0.637) (0.554) 
 
(0.593) (0.532) 
combrep  -0.00710 0.00766  -0.0187 0.00651 
  
(0.0111) (0.00976) 
 
(0.0105) (0.00949) 
lngsppc  0.818* 0.793*  1.481* 0.803* 
  
(0.0152) (0.103) 
 
(0.0987) (0.122) 
pitax   -0.485   -1.219* 
   
(0.428) 
  
(0.421) 
licgsp   -47.84*   -66.11* 
   
(12.73) 
  
(12.26) 
lngsp   0.403*   0.387* 
   
(0.0727) 
  
(0.0701) 
ba   -0.0281*   -0.0244* 
   
(0.00283) 
  
(0.00314) 
manufratio   4.161*   3.246* 
   
(0.342) 
  
(0.393) 
youngshare   -1.448*   -3.394* 
   
(0.515) 
  
(0.547) 
oldshare   4.162*   1.249 
   (0.813)   (0.947) 
 
Fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects? no no no yes yes yes 
N 1084 1064 998 1084 1064 998 
R2 0.146 0.787 0.858 0.782 0.825 0.877 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
In most specifications, the sales burden variable is statistically insignificant, and the only 
exception is an anomalous positive sign in equation (1). Throwback rules have a negative effect 
on sales in equation (5) but are otherwise statistically insignificant. The throwback/sales burden 
interaction term always has a negative sign, but it is never statistically significant.  
 
Control variables are typically as expected. Lower unemployment or higher GSP increase sales, 
and states with higher per capita GSP and manufacturing ratios tend to have higher sales. 
Corporate licence fees have a negative association with sales; in equation (6), an increase in 
licence fees of 25 per cent of the mean value for this variable reduces sales by 1.1 per cent. 
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Although fixed state effects are clearly indicated, Appendix Table A3 shows the results for 
pooled and region effects specifications for reference.11  
 
4.4 Discussion of activity results 
 
The above results indicate very few negative tax burden effects on employment, investment, or 
sales. What is one to make of this finding? First, it may simply be the case that at low tax rates, 
economic activity is not that responsive to the tax burdens associated with formulary 
apportionment. Employment and investment decisions may be determined by more important 
considerations, and sales are determined by where customers are. While it is likely to be the 
case that real economic activity is more responsive to tax burdens at higher tax rates, it is also 
the case that employment and investment mobility is probably far easier (i.e., more footloose) 
within countries than between countries. The former consideration implies that tax responses 
would be larger in the international context, whereas the latter consideration implies smaller tax 
responses. 
 
Second, it should be noted that this work contrasts with some, but not all, prior work on US 
states. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) find that employment is responsive to tax burden 
differences across states; Gupta and Hofmann (2003) find small capital expenditure responses 
in some specifications; and Klassen and Shackelford (1998) find that sales are sensitive to tax 
burdens in throwback states. However, as noted earlier, these studies all employ data that ends 
by the mid-1990s. Also, some specifications do not include adequate controls, such as state-
specific effects.  
 
Therefore, I also analysed subsamples of the data focusing on the early and later time periods. 
There are reasons to expect that tax responsiveness could change over time. For example, one 
hypothesis is that first-mover states (that increased the sales factor weights during a period 
when other states were largely using the traditional formula) would have gained a larger 
competitive advantage vis à vis other states in comparison to late-mover states (that changed 
their formulas in a context where many other states had already adopted formulas with 
disproportionately heavy sales weights).  
 
There are some important changes in the results when the sample is limited to early years 
(ending in 1995). For the analysis of employment, there are more negative and/or statistically 
significant effects of payroll tax burdens. For the capital expenditure analysis regressions, the 
asset tax burden loses its (perversely) positive effect on investment, and it instead becomes 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. For the sales regressions, there are some negative tax 
effects for throwback states. These results offer some limited support for the first-mover 
hypothesis above, where states that alter formulas first are more likely to gain at the expense of 
other states before tax competition becomes pervasive. 
 
4.5 Government corporate tax revenue  
 
This time period has experienced a large increase in the importance of corporate profits. Figure 
2 shows corporate profits as a share of GDP for the US as a whole (left axis), as well as US 
state and local corporate tax revenues relative to GDP (right axis). Over the past quarter 
century, corporate profits have increased from 7 per cent of GDP to over 12 per cent of GDP; 
                                                 
11  Here, tax effects are typically minimal. There is no negative effect associated with corporate licence fees or sales corporate 
tax burdens. In one case (column 2), throwback rules have a negative effect, and in one case (column 3) the interaction 
between the sales burden and the throwback rule has a negative effect. 
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though they fluctuate with the cyclical position of the economy, there is a clear upward trend. 
State and local corporate tax revenues also fluctuate with the state of the economy, but there is 
a small downward trend over this time period. 
 
Figure 2 Corporate profits and state corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP 
 
 
 
Note: Data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as reported in the 2013 Economic Report of the President. 2012 data is 
preliminary; revenue data for 2012 is from the BEA and the Office of Management and Budget. 
 
Table 5 reports regressions considering determinants of state government corporate tax 
revenues as a share of GSP; columns (1) to (3) include state fixed effects and columns (4) to (6) 
include state and year fixed effects. Policy choices have important effects on revenue. Tax rates 
are positively and statistically significantly associated with revenues in all specifications. A tax 
rate one percentage point higher is typically associated with a share of corporate tax revenue in 
GSP that is about 5 per cent higher.12  
  
                                                 
12  As the average tax coefficient in this table is 1.644, a tax rate one percentage point higher increases the ratio of tax revenue 
to GSP by about .0164. The mean corporate tax revenue to GSP ratio is 0.34, so the revenue to GSP ratio increases by 
4.8%. 
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Table 5 Corporate state income tax revenue/GSP regressions, state fixed effects (1-3), 
state and year fixed effects (4-6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
rate 1.648* 1.622* 1.494* 1.591* 1.799* 1.710* 
 
(0.298) (0.332) (0.336) (0.264) (0.292) (0.293) 
salesw -0.133* -0.0426 -0.0334 -0.0510* -0.0627* -0.0524* 
 
(0.0199) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0215) (0.0234) (0.0232) 
unem -1.553* -1.355* -1.446* -2.527* -1.934* -2.310* 
 
(0.173) (0.184) (0.186) (0.255) (0.312) (0.317) 
lnosurplus  0.0724* 0.0592*  0.0122 -0.0177 
  
(0.0274) (0.0279) 
 (0.0295) (0.0299) 
share  -0.393* -0.337*  -0.420* -0.388* 
  
(0.116) (0.118) 
 (0.168) (0.171) 
throwback   0.0620*   0.0456* 
   
(0.0162) 
  (0.0142) 
combrep   -0.00894   -0.0258* 
   
(0.00802) 
  (0.00733) 
forchoice   0.00347   0.00466 
   
(0.0138) 
  (0.0122) 
crchoice   -0.00784   -0.0215* 
   
(0.00902) 
  (0.00910) 
       
Fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects? no no no yes yes yes 
N 1122 959 947 1122 959 947 
R2 0.147 0.144 0.162 0.390 0.364 0.388 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
Higher sales weights lower revenues in equations (1), (4), (5), and (6) with 95 per cent 
confidence, in equation (2) with 89 per cent confidence, and always have a negative sign. 
Taking the average sales weight coefficient from this table, this implies that moving from an 
equal-weighted formula to one that double-weights sales will be associated with a share of 
corporate tax revenue in GSP that is about 2.5 per cent lower.13 States with throwback rules 
have higher revenues, and other tax policy variables often have statistically insignificant 
coefficients.  
 
Control variables are as expected. Higher state unemployment is associated with lower 
corporate tax revenues; higher corporate profits, measured by operating surplus, are associated 
with higher revenues. As the share of business returns that are pass-through entities increases, 
corporate tax revenues decrease. As above, Appendix Table A4 reports results from pooled and 
region-effect specifications.14  
 
  
                                                 
13  The average sales weight coefficient in this table is -0.0498, including the two statistically insignificant results as 0. A sales 
weight 17 percentage points higher decreases the ratio of tax revenue to GSP by about .17 * -0.0498, or -.0084. The mean 
corporate tax revenue to GSP ratio is .34. So the revenue to GSP ratio decreases by 2.5%. 
14  In these results, tax rates continue to be positively associated with revenues, and sales weights continue to be negatively 
associated with revenues, with a more sizeable negative impact. Both throwback rules and required combined reporting are 
associated with higher revenues. 
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4.6 Extensions 
 
Several extensions and robustness checks were considered. Results are summarised briefly 
here but all tables are available from the author upon request. First, as noted above, 
subsamples of the data set focusing on the early and later time periods were analysed. Indeed, 
there are some important changes in the results when the sample is limited to early years 
(ending in 1995). As noted above, activity, and especially employment, appears to be more 
negatively related to tax burdens in the early time period. In addition, in the revenue regressions, 
in both pooled and fixed effects specifications, the sales weight term no longer has a negative 
effect on tax revenues when the sample is restricted to early years. One plausible explanation 
for this set of findings is that, as tax competition became more pervasive, it resulted in far lower 
‘bang for the buck’ for states raising their formula sales weights in an attempt to encourage job 
creation and investment in their home state. Positive effects on jobs and investments 
disappeared, and, instead, states simply lost corporate tax revenue. 
 
Second, all of the above analyses were done on specifications that deliberately excluded 
Alaska, Hawaii and the District of Columbia, as is the tradition in much state-level empirical 
research. Still, all results were checked without this exclusion, and this exclusion does not affect 
any of the main policy conclusions. 
 
Third, I included alternate measures of the dependent variables, when possible. For 
employment, there are other BEA series that show non-farm, private payroll and manufacturing 
employment. There are also measures from surveys of foreign multinational firms with US 
affiliates that show employment and manufacturing employment. Finally, a measure of labour 
force participation can be constructed by taking the ratio of the labour force to the working age 
population. In most cases the tax policy results were broadly similar. The one exception was 
labour force participation, which showed a persistent negative relationship to payroll burdens in 
fixed effects specifications.  
 
For capital expenditure, one may also consider a series on property, plant and equipment 
investments by foreign multinational firms; like capital expenditure, these were not negatively 
related to asset burdens in the fixed effects specifications. For sales, the Census reports a retail 
sales figure every five years. While this entails fewer observations than the Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers’ sales data, the tax policy variable results were similar.  
 
4.7 Policy endogeneity concerns 
 
Studies on the consequences of tax policy are often plagued by concerns of endogenous 
relationships between policy parameters and dependent variables. For example, if state 
policymakers choose sales weights and tax rates with the hope of improving disappointing 
economic conditions, we may find a negative relationship between employment and lower sales 
weights due to that policy impetus, even if the lower sales weight eventually boosts employment. 
Or, perhaps some policy environments are inherently more business-friendly, and in these 
environments states adopt lower tax rates and payroll/asset weights in their formulas but also 
undertake myriad other policy changes that also affect underlying economic fundamentals. In 
both cases, we would be concerned of biased results, although the nature of the bias is in the 
opposite direction in these two examples. 
 
In several respects, the above analyses are responsive to these concerns. For example, 
variables are typically included that reflect the underlying economic conditions of the state (GSP, 
unemployment, etc.). Also, the key tables in the text all include state-specific fixed effects, which 
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should address some of the business climate concerns. Many specifications also include year 
effects that should capture macroeconomic shocks as well as other time-specific phenomena.  
 
However, it is also useful to examine possible determinants of policy changes. Therefore, I 
examined two probit analyses, considering the determinants of state decisions to increase the 
sales weight in their apportionment formulas (Appendix Table A5), or to lower corporate tax 
rates (Appendix Table A6). Over the entire sample, in 8 per cent of observations states increase 
the sales weight in their apportionment formulas, and in 3 per cent of observations states lower 
their corporate tax rate by at least nine-tenths of one percentage point. (Occasionally, states 
undertake very mild or gradual rate reductions, and I exclude these instances from the analysis.)  
 
Tables A5 and A6 both show specifications that include more independent variables as you 
move rightwards across the table. The baseline specification (column 1) models the policy 
change as depending on the mean policy of other states, the state unemployment rate, 
Republican control over both legislative and executive branches of state government, 
Democratic control over both branches (with the omitted category being split control), and 
whether it is an election year. Column 2 also includes other tax policies and state GSP per 
capita; column 3 includes the debt/GSP and federal aid/GSP ratios for states as well as the 
share of the population that is young (18 and under) or old (65 and older); and column 4 
includes lags of prior values for other states’ policies, tax rates, GSP, unemployment, and 
political outcomes. 
 
The remarkable feature of the probit regressions is how few statistically significant determinants 
of policy changes are apparent in the results. Across four sales weight specifications, the only 
variable that is associated with higher sales weights is the mean weight in other states (in two 
columns) and the lag of the mean rate of the sales weight in other states (in column four). 
Across four tax rate change specifications, there is only one statistically significant coefficient, 
the mean tax rate in other states (in equation 4 only). These results provide substantial evidence 
that tax policy changes are not explained well by seemingly plausible observable variables, thus 
reducing possible policy endogeneity concerns. 
 
 
5  Conclusions and policy implications  
 
US states have a long experience with the formulary apportionment of corporate income. In 
comparison to separate accounting, formulary apportionment substantially reduces concerns 
regarding the shifting of income from high-tax to low-tax states. Corporate tax liabilities are 
based on national income and the factors in the formula, factors that reflect underlying economic 
activity. Indeed, Mintz and Smart (2004) provide evidence of reduced income shifting under 
formulary apportionment. 
 
Under separate accounting, firms have more flexibility in how they account for where income is 
earned, and a long body of empirical research demonstrates that corporations are eager to 
reduce their tax liabilities by utilising such flexibility. Indeed, due to tax-motivated transfer pricing 
and income shifting, the booking of global income is quite sensitive to tax rate differences across 
countries.15  
 
Still, this does not mean that tax competition disappears under formulary apportionment. Indeed, 
                                                 
15 See De Mooij (2005) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) for reviews.  
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it has long been recognised that firms face tax incentives to distort the location of formula factors 
in order to reduce their tax burdens. In US states, policymakers have responded to business 
lobbying by systematically lowering the weight on assets and payroll in their apportionment 
formulas, and raising the sales weight, in an attempt to lure tax-sensitive jobs and investments to 
their states. In 1986, the beginning of this study, 80 per cent of states used an equal-weighted 
formula; by 2012 only 17 per cent of states that taxed corporate income had an equal-weighted 
formula, choosing instead formulas with higher weights on sales. 
 
There is evidence, particularly in Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), that state policymakers were 
initially successful in attracting jobs from other states with such strategies, although evidence 
indicates that these policies were ‘beggar thy neighbour’, since states that gained employment 
did so at the expense of other states. However, in the time period of this study, 1986 to 2012, 
there is scant evidence that state employment, investment, or sales are sensitive to corporate 
tax policy parameters, once an adequate set of control variables are included in the analysis. 
These findings suggest some cautious optimism for advocates of international formulary 
apportionment. Formulary apportionment has the potential to reduce income-shifting incentives 
without generating accompanying large tax responses in economic activity such as employment 
and investment. 
 
It is important to note that tax rates in US states are typically lower than those found at the 
national level, so tax responsiveness of real activity may be higher internationally, in the 
presence of higher tax rates. On the other hand, tax competition is also likely to be fiercer within 
countries than between countries, due to the greater mobility of capital and labour, easier 
corporate relocation, and more intense product price competition due to seamless goods 
mobility, more perfect information, and the absence of exchange rate fluctuations.   
 
The absence of economic activity responses to tax burdens under formulary apportionment in 
this analysis of US states may also be related to the extended time period of this study. While 
early states that changed formulas may have gained employment at the expense of other states, 
as more states changed their formulas, the relative competitive advantage diminished. This 
suggests that the dynamics of tax competition under formulary apportionment are likely to 
change over time. If countries have the flexibility to adopt distinct formulas, there may be a 
temptation to pursue beggar-my-neighbour policy choices in an attempt to lure economic activity 
from other jurisdictions, but if these strategies are adopted by many jurisdictions they may prove 
ineffective over time.  
 
The analysis also provides evidence that tax competition pressures are harmful to government 
revenues, as findings indicate that tax revenues are sensitive to tax policy choices regarding tax 
rates, sales weights, and throwback rules. This particular finding suggests that international 
coordination to choose harmonised formulas – and to harmonise other aspects of tax base 
definition – is particularly desirable. Not only would this reduce the potential for double taxation 
(and double non-taxation), it would also reduce beggar-my-neighbour policy choices that are 
ultimately likely to generate tax base erosion. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1  Data sources 
 
In general, data was collected for the fifty states as well as the District of Columbia over the 
period 1986-2012, although in most reported regression analyses some states were excluded, 
as described in the text.  
 
Data on US state corporate tax policies, including both tax rates and various rules, comes from 
several sources. These include The Book of the States by the Council of State Governments 
(1986 to 2001), Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (1986 to 1994) by the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and the Commerce Clearing House publications 
The Multistate Corporate Tax Almanac (1986-1989), the Multistate Corporate Tax Guide (1995-
2000), the State Tax Handbook (2001-2008) and the US Master Multistate Corporate Tax Guide 
(2006-2013).  
 
Data on the share of corporate returns that are pass-through organisations is from a special 
tabulation from the IRS, based on data reported in Publication 6149. This variable is defined as 
the number of returns filed by partnerships and S corporations relative to the total number of 
corporate tax returns.16 
 
Data on employment is from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA]. For manufacturing 
employment, data for 1986 to 1990 is based on SIC industry codes, and data for 1990-2012 is 
based on NAICS codes. For manufacturing, the 1990 ratio of SIC to NAICS manufacturing data 
is used to adjust the late 1980s data to NAICS equivalents.  
 
The BEA also provides data on total income, earnings, wages, corporate gross operating 
surplus, and GSP. The GSP series are also affected by the change from SIC to NAICS codes, 
so the late 1980s data is similarly adjusted. 
 
The BEA provides data on foreign direct investment into US states, including the gross property, 
plant and equipment of affiliates, the number of affiliates, the employment of affiliates, and the 
manufacturing employment of affiliates. For the period 1986-2006, data is for all non-bank 
affiliates. Data for 2007 to 2010 is not strictly comparable since they also include banks, but this 
data is adjusted to be comparable by using data on ratios of comparable series. 
 
Data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers is collected from several sources of the US 
Census Bureau including CDs (1987-91), publications on the Annual Survey of Manufacturers 
(1992-96), web pages (2002-11), and an Excel spreadsheet emailed from a Census Bureau 
employee (1997-2001). This data includes information on manufacturing employment, payroll, 
materials costs, shipments, value added, and capital expenditure.  
 
The US Census Bureau was the source of data on corporate tax revenues, corporate licence 
fees, state populations, and the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. For 
the bachelor’s degree share data, data has been input for the years 1986-89 based on an 
                                                 
16  S corporations are corporations that pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their shareholders for 
federal tax purposes. 
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average of the growth rates in this share between the years 1980 and 1990 and the years 1990 
and 1998. For the years 1991 to 1997, data has been input based on the growth rate over the 
period 1990-98. Missing data for 2001 is based on an average of 2000 and 2002, and data for 
2012 is extrapolated based on 2011 data and the growth rate for the prior year. 
 
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics gives data on the unemployment rate and the labour force.  
 
Data on political control variables comes from the online database of Klarner Politics. See 
<http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm>. 
 
Data on individual income tax rates was based on the top bracket. Data is from The Book of the 
States by the Council of State Governments in most years, though some years were not 
available. For the years 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, rates came from Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; for 1999, the State Tax 
Handbook by the Commerce Clearing House; for 2001 and 2013, the Tax Policy Center; and for 
2012, the Tax Foundation. Missing data was interpolated in cases where the tax rate in prior and 
subsequent years was the same. For states where tax due is a fraction of the federal liability, the 
tax rate was imputed based on the federal top rate in the same year. 
 
Data on state election years, the age distribution of the state population, federal aid to the 
states, and state debt levels was generously shared from a dataset of Jon Rork. The original 
sources of this data were the US Statistical Abstract (for election years), the US Census (for age 
distribution and federal aid), and State Government Finances (for debt). 
 
Further information about the details of data acquisition and more detailed variable definitions 
are available from the author upon request. 
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Appendix 2  Results for pooled (OLS) and region effects specifications 
 
Table A1 Employment regressions, pooled estimates (1-3) and region effects (4-6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
payburden -39.74* -31.84* -1.602* -27.61* -16.00* -0.685* 
 
(2.963) (3.031) (0.252) (2.774) (3.039) (0.216) 
natlunem -3.224 -3.190 -1.330* -2.255 -2.487 -1.155* 
 
(1.757) (1.693) (0.126) (1.422) (1.393) (0.0984) 
throwback  -0.390* 0.0165*  -0.114* -0.00107 
  
(0.0525) (0.00417) 
 
(0.0505) (0.00361) 
combrep  -0.134* 0.0264*  -0.0248 0.0217* 
  
(0.0536) (0.00418) 
 
(0.0467) (0.00340) 
lngsppc  0.343* -0.887*  0.489* -0.933* 
  
(0.0772) (0.0116) 
 
(0.0693) (0.00957) 
pitax   0.289*   0.125 
   
(0.0912) 
  
(0.0801) 
licgsp   0.556   5.448* 
   
(1.245) 
  
(1.130) 
lngsp   0.965*   0.981* 
   
(0.00253) 
  
(0.00251) 
ba   0.00821*   0.0112* 
   
(0.00063) 
  
(0.00059) 
manufratio   0.562*   1.006* 
   
(0.0551) 
  
(0.0603) 
youngshare   -0.406*   -1.344* 
   
(0.137) 
  
(0.119) 
oldshare   0.0826   -0.495* 
   
(0.162) 
  
(0.142) 
newe    -1.168* -1.052* 0.0117 
    
(0.0828) (0.0886) (0.00791) 
southeast    -0.307* -0.0639 0.0326* 
    
(0.0765) (0.0809) (0.00645) 
glake    -0.183* 0.0771 0.0323* 
    
(0.0831) (0.0888) (0.00707) 
plain    -0.911* -0.616* 0.143* 
    
(0.0973) (0.104) (0.00803) 
rocky    -1.724* -1.464* 0.169* 
    
(0.100) (0.112) (0.00985) 
swest    -0.675* -0.423* 0.0841* 
    
(0.0863) (0.0955) (0.00819) 
west    0.214* 0.440* 0.0287* 
    
(0.100) (0.109) (0.00833) 
 
N 1122 1102 1032 1122 1102 1032 
R2 0.14 0.21 0.99 0.44 0.47 0.99 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
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Table A2  Capital expenditure regressions, pooled (1-3) and region effects (4-6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
assetbur -46.51* -37.58* -2.143 -29.31* -14.28* -1.351 
 
(3.367) (3.454) (1.323) (3.097) (3.353) (1.447) 
unem 5.260* 5.195* -2.002* -1.698 -1.333 -2.013* 
 
(1.597) (1.538) (0.554) (1.321) (1.274) (0.574) 
throwback  -0.332* 0.0730*  -0.0359 0.0172 
  
(0.0599) (0.0222) 
 
(0.0557) (0.0243) 
combrep  -0.291* -0.00407  -0.127* -0.0114 
  
(0.0605) (0.0218) 
 
(0.0507) (0.0223) 
lngsppc  0.431* 0.341*  0.709* 0.259* 
  
(0.0912) (0.0631) 
 
(0.0792) (0.0654) 
pitax   -0.158   -0.210 
   
(0.494) 
  
(0.547) 
licgsp   -3.379   8.612 
   
(6.608) 
  
(7.558) 
lngsp   0.889*   0.902* 
   
(0.0140) 
  
(0.0172) 
ba   -0.0411*   -0.0377* 
   
(0.00335) 
  
(0.00395) 
manufratio   7.295*   7.665* 
   
(0.300) 
  
(0.421) 
youngshare   0.0184   -1.200 
   
(0.736) 
  
(0.801) 
oldshare   -6.843*   -6.594* 
   
(0.864) 
  
(0.959) 
neweng    -0.996* -0.885* 0.162* 
    
(0.0926) (0.0979) (0.0531) 
southeast    0.0288 0.324* 0.0755 
    
(0.0856) (0.0893) (0.0433) 
glake    0.329* 0.638* 0.183* 
    
(0.0929) (0.0980) (0.0474) 
plain    -0.762* -0.411* 0.174* 
    
(0.110) (0.117) (0.0544) 
rocky    -1.877* -1.566* 0.196* 
    
(0.112) (0.124) (0.0661) 
swest    -0.463* -0.181 0.282* 
    
(0.0960) (0.105) (0.0548) 
west    0.376* 0.647* 0.211* 
    
(0.113) (0.120) (0.0555) 
 
N 1084 1064 998 1084 1064 998 
R2 0.17 0.23 0.92 0.48 0.52 0.92 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
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Table A3  Sales regressions, pooled estimates (1-3), with region effects (4-6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
salesburden 10.51* 0.747 3.640* 9.819* 1.842 1.035* 
 
(1.583) (1.882) (0.472) (1.344) (1.591) (0.446) 
unem 10.24* 8.958* -0.496 2.230 2.016 0.600 
 
(1.718) (1.593) (0.378) (1.342) (1.222) (0.340) 
throwback  -0.675* 0.173*  -0.185 -0.0194 
  
(0.136) (0.0335) 
 
(0.113) (0.0318) 
throwsb  7.182* -3.255*  3.271 0.0937 
  
(3.184) (0.732) 
 
(2.497) (0.679) 
combrep  -0.314* 0.00963  -0.101* 0.0194 
  
(0.0630) (0.0150) 
 
(0.0489) (0.0134) 
lngsppc  0.889* 0.629*  1.045* 0.471* 
  
(0.0948) (0.0418) 
 
(0.0721) (0.0388) 
pitax   -0.335   0.503 
   
(0.344) 
  
(0.332) 
licgsp   5.658   19.80* 
   
(4.392) 
  
(4.539) 
lngsp   0.920*   0.938* 
   
(0.00971) 
  
(0.0104) 
ba   -0.0530*   -0.0405* 
   
(0.00225) 
  
(0.00241) 
manufratio   7.157*   8.123* 
   
(0.208) 
  
(0.261) 
youngshare   -0.464   -2.927* 
   
(0.519) 
  
(0.482) 
oldshare   -5.488*   -5.439* 
   
(0.627) 
  
(0.591) 
newengland    -1.230* -1.047* 0.0342 
    
(0.0945) (0.0959) (0.0325) 
southeast2    0.244* 0.468* 0.134* 
    
(0.0877) (0.0819) (0.0259) 
glake2    0.431* 0.728* 0.182* 
    
(0.0918) (0.0904) (0.0280) 
plain2    -0.373* 0.0152 0.486* 
    
(0.109) (0.111) (0.0316) 
rocky2    -2.034* -1.607* 0.258* 
    
(0.115) (0.120) (0.0397) 
swest2    -0.312* -0.116 0.349* 
    
(0.0980) (0.0985) (0.0330) 
west2    0.201 0.490* 0.0746* 
    
(0.115) (0.117) (0.0333) 
 
N 1084 1064 998 1084 1064 998 
R2 0.07 0.22 0.96 0.48 0.58 0.97 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
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Table A4 Corporate state income tax revenue/GSP regressions, pooled estimates (1-3), 
with region effects (4-6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rate 2.267* 2.209* 2.095* 0.824* 0.916* 1.221* 
 
(0.233) (0.249) (0.255) (0.251) (0.266) (0.272) 
salesw -0.163* -0.123* -0.124* -0.185* -0.123* -0.0992* 
 
(0.0232) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0224) (0.0261) (0.0268) 
unem -0.216 -0.0717 -0.0568 -0.679* -0.594* -0.654* 
 
(0.253) (0.267) (0.264) (0.233) (0.245) (0.244) 
lnosurplus  0.00636 0.0120*  -0.000133 0.00178 
  
(0.00523) (0.00542) 
 
(0.00576) (0.00578) 
share  -0.246* -0.245*  -0.228* -0.256* 
  
(0.0553) (0.0558) 
 
(0.0514) (0.0526) 
throwback   0.0343*   0.0462* 
   
(0.0106) 
  
(0.0110) 
combrep   0.0237*   0.0240* 
   
(0.0105) 
  
(0.00979) 
forchoice   -0.0832*   -0.00559 
   
(0.0170) 
  
(0.0168) 
crchoice   0.000941   -0.00308 
   
(0.0140) 
  
(0.0126) 
newengland    -0.00143 -0.00623 -0.0355 
    
(0.0164) (0.0189) (0.0201) 
southeast2    -0.106* -0.0949* -0.0959* 
    
(0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0170) 
glake2    0.0554* 0.0582* 0.0342 
    
(0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0181) 
plain2    -0.147* -0.147* -0.181* 
    
(0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0220) 
rocky2    -0.0588* -0.0291 -0.0779* 
    
(0.0199) (0.0242) (0.0259) 
swest2    -0.181* -0.164* -0.188* 
    
(0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0207) 
west2    -0.0219 -0.0207 -0.0603* 
    
(0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0228) 
       
N 1122 959 947 1122 959 947 
R2 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.31 0.33 0.35 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
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Appendix 3  Policy probit specifications 
 
Table A5  Probit regressions on probability of raising apportionment weight on sales 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
meansalesw 1.379 1.003 5.140* 36.03* 
 
(0.708) (1.540) (2.547) (7.131) 
unem 4.880 5.546 6.022 4.504 
 
(3.041) (3.458) (3.797) (7.750) 
rep 0.128 0.0777 0.00606 0.500 
 
(0.140) (0.152) (0.167) (0.301) 
dem -0.189 -0.161 -0.177 -0.203 
 
(0.145) (0.148) (0.155) (0.270) 
elecyr 0.00486 -0.0155 -0.00289 -0.206 
 
(0.127) (0.132) (0.135) (0.167) 
lngsppc  0.122 -0.677 -0.856 
  
(0.370) (0.596) (0.809) 
rate  -1.726 1.400 14.69 
  
(3.185) (3.775) (11.54) 
pitax  -2.949 -2.253 -6.513 
 
 (2.666) (3.158) (15.47) 
debtgsp   -2.453 -2.286 
   
(2.381) (2.974) 
aidgsp   -15.57 -9.506 
   
(8.511) (9.458) 
youngshare   -2.775 -1.924 
   
(4.769) (5.611) 
oldshare   -6.505 -8.317 
   
(5.854) (6.693) 
L.meansalesw    -24.64* 
    
(8.317) 
L2.meansalesw    -6.710 
    
(7.466) 
L.rate    -11.75 
    
(15.21) 
L2.rate    -0.572 
    
(11.31) 
L.pitax    7.318 
    
(21.57) 
L2.pitax    -2.633 
    
(15.35) 
L.unem    5.262 
    
(11.49) 
L2.unem    1.284 
    
(9.371) 
L.lngsp    4.792 
    
(3.284) 
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L2.lngsp    -4.634 
    
(3.271) 
L.rep    -0.343 
    
(0.411) 
L2.rep    -0.427 
    
(0.323) 
L.dem    -0.189 
    
(0.362) 
L2.dem    0.0450 
    
(0.279) 
 
N 1055 987 946 885 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
 
Table A6  Probit regressions on probability of lowering corporate tax rate 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
meanrate -7.343 -27.85 -62.69 -319.6* 
 
(35.35) (53.02) (59.41) (111.9) 
unem 0.0835 -1.132 3.114 9.957 
 
(4.229) (4.571) (4.834) (11.76) 
rep -0.0868 -0.0504 -0.0326 -0.0889 
 
(0.193) (0.201) (0.222) (0.403) 
dem -0.283 -0.300 -0.298 -0.184 
 
(0.204) (0.209) (0.217) (0.405) 
elecyr -0.153 -0.155 -0.161 -0.221 
 
(0.180) (0.184) (0.189) (0.223) 
lngsppc  -0.192 -0.330 -0.963 
  
(0.349) (0.414) (0.674) 
salesw  -0.0251 -0.0111 -2.061 
  
(0.465) (0.502) (1.933) 
pitax  0.0701 3.796 -20.25 
  
(3.228) (3.692) (14.89) 
debtgsp   -0.986 -1.061 
   
(2.505) (3.351) 
aidgsp   -12.59 -0.143 
   
(8.505) (10.55) 
youngshare   -3.659 -5.587 
   
(6.669) (8.161) 
oldshare   7.485 4.103 
   
(6.979) (8.433) 
L.meanrate    243.0 
    
(134.4) 
L2.meanrate    88.07 
 
 
   
(126.2) 
 34
L.salesw    0.00943 
    
(2.712) 
L2.salesw    2.050 
    
(1.954) 
L.pitax    36.39 
    
(21.38) 
L2.pitax    -10.44 
    
(16.08) 
L.unem    -12.37 
    
(18.58) 
L2.unem    6.343 
    
(15.58) 
L.lngsp    -0.636 
    
(4.443) 
L2.lngsp    0.904 
    
(4.441) 
L.rep    -0.612 
    
(0.538) 
L2.rep    0.755 
    
(0.399) 
L.dem    -0.00833 
    
(0.488) 
L2.dem    -0.460 
    
(0.379) 
N 1165 993 952 880 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
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